ACE Bounds; SEMs with Equilibrium Conditions by Richardson, Thomas S. & Robins, James M.
ar
X
iv
:1
41
0.
04
70
v1
  [
sta
t.M
E]
  2
 O
ct 
20
14
Statistical Science
2014, Vol. 29, No. 3, 363–366
DOI: 10.1214/14-STS485
Main article DOI: 10.1214/14-STS480
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2014
ACE Bounds; SEMs with Equilibrium
Conditions
Thomas S. Richardson and James M. Robins
We congratulate the author on an enlightening ac-
count of the instrumental variable approach from
the viewpoint of Econometrics. We first make some
comments regarding the bounds on the ACE under
the nonparametric IV model, and then discuss po-
tential outcomes in the market equilibrium model.
1. ACE BOUNDS UNDER THE IV MODEL
We consider the model in which X and Y are bi-
nary, taking values in {0,1}, while Z takes K states
{1, . . . ,K}. We use the notation X(zi) to indicate
X(z = i), similarly Y (xj) for Y (x= j). We consider
four different sets of assumptions:
(i) Z⊥⊥Y (x0), Y (x1),X(z1), . . . ,X(zK);
(ii) Z⊥⊥Y (x0), Y (x1);
(iii) for i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, j ∈ {0,1}, Z⊥⊥X(zi),
Y (xj);
(iv) there exists a U such that U ⊥⊥Z and for
j ∈ {0,1}, Y (xj)⊥⊥X,Z | U .
Condition (i) is joint independence of Z and all
potential outcomes for Y and X . (ii) does not as-
sume independence (or existence) of counterfactu-
als for X . (iii) is a subset of the independences in
(i), none of which involve potential outcomes from
different worlds.1 The counterfactual independen-
cies (i), (ii), (iii) arise most naturally in the context
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1In other words, they do not involve both Y (x0) and Y (x1),
nor X(zi) and X(zj) for i 6= j.
where the instrument is randomized, as depicted
by the DAG in Figure 1(a). Assumption (iii) may
be read (via d-separation) from the Single-World
Intervention Graph (SWIG)2 G1(z,x), depicted in
Figure 1(b), which represents the factorization of
P (Z,X(z), Y (x),U), implied by the IV model.
Lastly (iv) consists of only three independence
statements, but does assume the existence of an
unobserved variable U that is sufficient to control
for confounding between X and Y . No assumption
is made concerning the existence of counterfactuals
X(z); confounding variables (U∗) between Z and X
are permitted (so long as U∗⊥⊥U ). The DAG G2
and corresponding SWIG G2(x) are shown in Fig-
ure 1(c), (d). In Richardson and Robins (2014), we
prove the following.
Theorem 1. Under any of the assumptions (i),
(ii), (iii), (iv), the set of possible joint distributions
P (Y (x0), Y (x1)) are characterized by the 8K in-
equalities:
P (Y (xi) = y)
≤ P (Y = y,X = i|Z = z)(1)
+P (X = 1− i|Z = z),
P (Y (x0) = y,Y (x1) = y˜)
≤ P (Y = y,X = 0|Z = z)(2)
+P (Y = y˜,X = 1|Z = z).
Thus a distribution P (X,Y |Z) is compatible with
the stated assumptions if and only if there exists a
distribution P (Y (x0), Y (x1)) satisfying (1) and (2).
Theorem 2. Under any of the assumptions (i),
(ii), (iii), (iv) for all i, j ∈ {0,1}, P (Y (xi) = j) ≤
g(i, j), where
g(i, j) ≡min
{
min
z
[P (X = i, Y = j|Z = z)
+P (X = 1− i|Z = z)],
2See Richardson and Robins (2013) for details.
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Fig. 1. (a) IV model with no confounding between Z and
X; (b) SWIG representing P (Z,X(z), Y (x),U); (c) IV model
with confounding between Z and X; (d) SWIG representing
P (Z,X,Y (x),U,U∗).
min
z,z˜:z 6=z˜
[P (X = i, Y = j|Z = z)
+P (X = 1− i, Y = 0|Z = z)
+P (X = i, Y = j|Z = z˜)
+P (X = 1− i, Y = 1|Z = z˜)]
}
.
Furthermore, P (Y (x0)) and P (Y (x1)) are variation
independent. Consequently,
1− g(1,0)− g(0,1) ≤ACE(X→ Y )
≤ g(0,0) + g(1,1)− 1.
These bounds are sharp.
Note that to evaluate g(i, j) requires finding a
minimum over K2 expressions. In the case where
K = 2, these bounds reduce to those given by Balke
and Pearl (1997), who assume (i).3 Robins (1989)
and Manski (1990) derived what are called the “nat-
ural bounds” on the ACE under the weaker assump-
tion that Z⊥⊥Y (x0) and Z⊥⊥Y (x1). As noted by
Imbens, without further assumptions these bounds
are not sharp. However, the natural bounds are
sharp under (i) or (iii), if, in addition, we as-
sume there are no Defiers (an assumption that has
testable implications). Cheng and Small (2006) con-
sidered bounds on the ACE when K = 3 under ad-
ditional assumptions.
3Dawid (2003) working in a non-counterfactual framework
also established the bounds for K = 2 under the DAG in Fig-
ure 1(a); however, his proof also applies to Figure 1(c). Robins
and Greenland (1996) observed that the Balke–Pearl bounds
were also sharp under (ii).
2. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND BICAUSAL
MODELS
Imbens’ clear description of the market equilib-
rium model is particularly informative. We also
strongly endorse the author’s contention that the
RHS of systems of structural equations should be
interpreted as describing potential outcomes for the
LHS.4
However, we note that this position has impor-
tant implications both for interpretation and in-
ference. Furthermore, it does not seem to be uni-
versally accepted within Economics. LeRoy (2006)
states that “economic models use the equality sym-
bol with its usual mathematical meaning, not with
the meaning of the assignment operator”; an ap-
proach that is clearly incompatible with an inter-
pretation in terms of potential outcomes. For exam-
ple, it becomes permissible to renormalize structural
equations to change which variable is on the LHS.
It has also been argued that statistical analyses of
such models should be invariant to the normaliza-
tion; see Hillier (1990), Basmann (1963).5 Contrary
to Imbens’ remark,6 this alternative view does not
appear to be motivated by considerations of mea-
surement error. LeRoy (2006) makes clear that he
does not believe that structural equations describe
potential outcomes for endogenous variables and
does not discuss issues relating to measurement.7
Rather, this appears to be a fundamental difference
in interpretation.
The market equilibrium model specifies potential
outcomes for Qdt (p), Q
s
t (p):
Qdt (p) = α
d + βdp+ εdt ,(3)
4 Pearl (2000), Lauritzen (2001), Lauritzen and Richardson
(2002) argue that these are not really “equations” but are
better viewed as “assignments” in computer languages, for
example, y← x + 1; see also Strotz and Wold (1960), page
420.
5For example, Greene (2003), page 401, states (in the con-
text of the IV model): “one significant virtue of [the Limited
Information Maximum Likelihood Estimator] is its invariance
to normalization of the equations.”
6Footnote 8, page 331.
7For example, LeRoy (2006), page 23, states that “The as-
sumption that it makes sense to delete one or more of the
structural equations and replace the value of the internal vari-
able so determined by a constant without altering the other
equations [. . . ] is virtually never satisfied in economic models
since each external variable typically affects equilibrium val-
ues of more than one internal variable.” He goes on to assert
“In fact, it is difficult to think of nontrivial models in any area
of research in which the [. . . ] assumption is satisfied.”
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Fig. 2. (a) Attempt to depict the bicausal model; (b) a
schematic showing the deterministic system (6)–(8); the edge
I denotes that P is the integral of ∆P ; see Iwasaki and Si-
mon (1994).
Qst (p) = α
s + βsp+ εst ,(4)
and imposes the equilibrium condition:8
Qdt (p) =Q
s
t(p).(5)
Strotz and Wold (1960) described such systems as
bicausal. It should be observed that the model does
not specify potential outcomes for price (Pt(qs, qd)),
nor does it view price as externally determined (i.e.,
exogenous). Instead price is determined implicitly
as a consequence of the equilibrium condition. In
this regard, the model might be regarded as incom-
plete: Indeed Haavelmo (1958) is quite critical of this
model for failing to offer any explanation as to how
the equilibrium price is determined. The model also
falls outside the scope of non-parametric structural
equation models (NPSEM) (see, e.g., Pearl (2000)),
which require one equation for each endogenous vari-
able;9 likewise the model defies standard graphical
representation, though see Figure 2(a).
A related question concerns whether there exist
dynamic acyclic (i.e., recursive) systems of struc-
tural equations that lead to the equilibrium distribu-
tion corresponding either to a cyclic system of struc-
tural equations or a bicausal system.10 Fisher (1970)
provides just such a “correspondence principle” un-
der which the distribution implied by a cyclic linear
8To simplify notation, throughout we work directly in terms
of log price and log quantity.
9Indeed LeRoy (2006) argues against the interpretation of
structural equations in terms of potential outcomes on the
grounds that this interpretation, as advanced by Pearl, re-
quires a one-to-one mapping between equations and endoge-
nous variables that he argues, does not make sense for the
market equilibrium model.
10Analysis of this question was stimulated by a heated de-
bate that arose between Wold, who advocated a recursive,
regression-based approach to demand analysis, and Haavelmo
and the Cowles Commission who advocated simultaneous
equations. See Haavelmo (1943), Bentzel and Wold (1946),
Wold and Jure´en (1953), Bentzel and Hansen (1954), Strotz
and Wold (1960), Basmann (1963); historical overviews are
given by Morgan (1991), Epstein (1987).
SEM is obtained as a time average of a determin-
istic set of first order difference equations reaching
a static equilibrium subject to stochastic boundary
conditions. The correspondence assumes that the
equilibration time is very fast relative to the inter-
val between observations so the time averaged vari-
ables are in deterministic equilibrium. Fisher also
derived conditions on the coefficient matrices of a
cyclic SEM that are required in order for the sys-
tem to reach equilibrium; in fact he further required
that each subset of structural equations also have
this property.
However, Fisher’s correspondence presumes a nor-
malization under which each variable is associated
with a single equation (as in an NPSEM), and hence
would not apply to a bicausal system. Richardson
(1996), Chapter 2, described a system of finite dif-
ference equations that gives rise to the bicausal sys-
tem (3)–(5):
Consumers: Qdt+(k+1)δ(pt+kδ)
(6)
= αd + βdpt+kδ + ε
d
t ,
Suppliers: Qst+(k+1)δ(pt+kδ)
(7)
= αs + βspt+kδ + ε
s
t ,
Merchants: Pt+(k+1)δ(q
d
t+kδ, q
s
t+kδ, pt+kδ)
(8)
= pt+kδ + λ(q
d
t+kδ − q
s
t+kδ),
for k = {0, . . . , δ−1 − 1}. Note that the disturbances
(εdt , ε
s
t ) represent boundary conditions and hence re-
main fixed during the interval [t, t+1). As in Fisher’s
correspondence, the observed variables correspond
to limiting time-averages over a unit interval:
Q
d
t = lim
δ→0
δ
δ−1−1∑
k=0
Qdt+kδ, Q
s
t = lim
δ→0
δ
δ−1−1∑
k=0
Qst+kδ,
P t = lim
δ→0
δ
δ−1−1∑
k=0
Pt+kδ.
Under suitable conditions on the coefficients, (Q
d
t ,Q
s
t ,
P t) obey equations (3)–(5). Note that Merchants’
equation (8) which includes P , leads to the equi-
librium condition (5) that does not.11 It might be
objected to the proposed model that there is no
11In causal terms, this model is similar to one presented
in Wold (1959). Wold viewed his model as a formalization of
Cournot’s theories.
4 T. S. RICHARDSON AND J. M. ROBINS
disturbance term in equation (8). The explanation
for this is that the disturbance terms in the non-
recursive model correspond to constant factors in
the deterministic evolution. The equation for price
gives the change in price during a small interval
(length δ) to the discrepancy between supply and
demand. Adding a disturbance term would say that
throughout the observation period (length 1) the
Merchants’ reaction to change in price was off by
a constant factor, so that even if quantities sup-
plied and demanded were identical, the Merchants
would change the price. Thus, if we add an error εpt
the model will not, in general, arrive at equilibrium
within the unit interval.12
Iwasaki and Simon (1994) represent equilibrat-
ing mechanisms via “causal influence diagrams” in
which the derivatives of variables are included. Un-
der this scheme, model (6)–(8) is represented by the
graph in Figure 2(b). This example serves to show
that time averages of (deterministic) equilibrating
systems need not have a structural equation for each
variable. See also (Dash and Druzdzel, 2001) for re-
lated work.
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